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Cointegration between government spending and output is rarely considered in fiscal re­
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I Introduction
Fiscal policy has long been a topic of little consensus among academics. Its nature and the vast
range of policy instruments are responsible for several challenges in modelling, namely the un­
derstanding for transmission channels. Accordingly, there is still no agreement on a theoretical
framework and empirical methodologies often provide contradictory evidence on its aggregate
effects. On the other hand, some argue that implementation lags condition fiscal policy: it takes
time for policymakers to perceive the economic cycle, formulate measures and put them into
place. By the time fiscal policy materialises, the economy may no longer be in the initial situ­
ation and, thus, the result may be different from what was expected. As a result, the topic was
mostly set aside from discussion.
In the past years, the interest in fiscal policy was renewed. With interest rates falling to
their zero lower bound, conventional monetary policy was no longer available. Policymakers
turned their attention to fiscal policy, seeking to minimise the negative effects of the Great Re­
cession. At the same time, its overuse originated the Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Euro Area as
governments were suffering from sudden stops in credit due to a massive accumulation of public
debt. It became imperative the study of the consequences of fiscal policy, both as a stabilisation
policy and as a debt consolidation mechanism.
Identifying exogenous fiscal shocks is the main challenge of empirical work due to the
inherent endogeneity of fiscal policy and output: fiscal variables also respond to fluctuations in
GDP, whether due to discretionary policy or automatic stabilisers. With the purpose of isolating
exogenous changes in fiscal policy various methodologies have been used: SVAR (Structural
Vector Autoregressions) with short­run restrictions pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
(followed by Perotti (2005), Perotti (2007), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Ilzetzki
et al. (2013)); VAR with signal restrictions as in Mountford and Uhlig (2009); the so­called Nar­
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rative Approach as in Romer and Romer (2010), Ramey (2011) and Barro and Redlick (2011);
Local projections using the Narrative Approach as in Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and
Zubairy (2018). In a recent survey, Ramey (2019) concluded that the different empirical studies
developed in the past years have estimated spending multipliers concentrated between 0.6 and
1 and tax multipliers between ­2 and ­3.
The simplest empirical specifications were adapted to account for state dependence as the­
ory predicts that multipliers may depend on several factors like the persistence of shocks, the
state of the economy, how the policy is financed, the debt­to­GDP ratio, country openness and
the exchange rate regime. The focus has been mainly on understanding if fiscal policy is more
effective as a stabilisation policy during periods with higher slack in the economy or accommo­
dating monetary policy. Opposite evidence was found on these issues: Auerbach and Gorod­
nichenko (2012) show that spending multipliers are higher during recessions using a SVAR
identification à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in a non­linear model, yet, Barro and Redlick
(2011) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) found no such evidence using the narrative approach.
The work of Christiano et al. (2011) indicates that government spending multipliers can be
very large in the presence of unresponsive nominal rates, such as the zero lower bound. How­
ever, empirical evidence has also been contradictory on these grounds: while Ramey (2011),
Ramey and Zubairy (2018) through the narrative approach found no strong evidence, Ilzetzki
et al. (2013) point out that the behaviour of monetary policy is key in determining the strength of
fiscal policy, using an identification scheme similar to the one in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) also contributed to the existent literature by studying how several
features of countries impact the estimated multipliers. Their evidence suggest that spending
multipliers are greater in industrialised countries than in developing countries. Yet, developing
countries present investment spending multipliers greater than 1 and different from spending
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ones, whereas this does not seem to be the case for developed countries. Moreover, under fixed
exchange rate regimes, spending multipliers are also higher than in countries under floating
regimes. For countries with high debt­to­GDP ratios, multipliers are null and may become neg­
ative over time.
Other developments concerning the role of public debt have contributed to a better un­
derstanding of the broad range of multipliers estimates. Debt sustainability plays an important
part in determining the availability of fiscal policy and the future paths of both government
spending and tax policy. Favero and Giavazzi (2007) adapted the usual SVAR model to include
debt dynamics, arguing that omitting public debt from the model leads to the extraction of non­
fundamental shocks and biased IRF (impulse response functions).
Empirical identification strategies are not flawless. The SVAR approach has been mainly
criticised for extracting fiscal shocks which were anticipated by agents. Ramey (2011) found
that both Ramey and Shapiro (1999) dates and professional forecasts Granger­cause the shocks
obtained using the SVAR approach. Following on this major pitfall of SVAR, Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) included professional forecasts in their model and reinforced Ramey’s
claim. On the other hand, the narrative approach is largely based on news from military expen­
diture or defence spending itself, which makes it not reproducible for the majority of countries
and raises the issue of extrapolating on the magnitude of non­defence multipliers. Perotti (2005)
also raises some questions on the validity of the conclusions taken, pointing that if at the time of
the defence news shocks there are other fiscal shocks the effects might be difficult to distinguish.
Other than providing spending and tax multipliers of different magnitudes, the SVAR and
narrative approaches also support different economic theories by predicting different behaviours
for consumption and real wages. As a result, some effort has been done to try to understand
the reasons for these discrepancies. Some of the previously mentioned literature relates state
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dependence and omitted variables bias to the different estimates. Nonetheless, identification
assumptions also seem to play an important role as Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Caldara and
Kamps (2012) show that each method entails a different implicit output elasticity with respect
to either spending or taxation. Ramey and Zubairy (2018) reproduced the analysis in Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) and reveal that the results are consequences of the assumptions made
when computing IRF. Additionally, Ramey (2011) demonstrates that the results in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) are due to expected/announced spending not being controlled for.
Nevertheless, an issue that seems to be overlooked in existent literature is the potential
cointegration between output and fiscal variables. The data suggests that the US government

















































Figure 1: US GDP and Government Expenditure Data, in logs of real per capita values
It is a well­accepted fact that GDP is not a stationary variable, however there is still no
common view on whether it results from a deterministic trend or a stochastic one. This raises
issues on how to better model the behaviour of GDP, and fiscal variables which exhibit similar
patterns. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate their SVARmodel assuming both specifications,
and as expected, even though results are similar, there is some persistence in the results of the
stochastic trend model which is not found in the deterministic trend model.
Stationarity tests suggest that GDP, as well as fiscal variables, are not trend stationary, but
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integrated of order 1, I(1). The usual procedure to deal with this type of variables is considering
the model in first differences (like in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). Yet, in the presence of coin­
tegration, this method not only reduces the set of information available to estimate themodel, but
it neglects the existence of a long­run relationship. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that con­
sidering cointegration does not change the results. However, the cointegration relation studied
lies in the argument of a stationary government budget, and therefore only considers spending
and revenue. In light of the previous considerations, one must consider the possibility of neither
results being accurate.
In Wagner (1892) is found the first theoretical argument supporting a common trend be­
tween the size of government and economic growth, the so­called Wagner’s Law2. The claim
relies on citizens demanding more public services and government intervention as the economy
becomes more developed. Government expenditure directed at health care, education, law en­
forcement, sanitation, transportation, among others is likely to increase as the country achieves
higher levels of development and economic growth. Moreover, some of these types of spending
can affect back output through spillovers on production. Accordingly, there are motives to be­
lieve in this long­run relationship, hence reasons to account for it when modelling fiscal policy3.
This paper attempts to bring some light into an issue not very often considered: cointegra­
tion between government spending and output, using a structural vector error correction model
(SVECM). The goal is to explore how this new set of information can be used to study the im­
pact of fiscal policy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
theoretical framework. Methodology is presented in section III. Section IV elaborates on the
empirical model and shows the results. Finally, section V concludes. Further details on data,
econometric tests and methodology as well as additional results can be found in the appendix.
2This theory states that government size grows more than proportionately to output. In case of this paper, it is
considered a proportional relation as exhibited in the data. However, the arguments still hold.
3Nonetheless, it does not have to be the case. In fact, not all countries’ data depicts this property.
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II Framework for the Analysis
As argued before, there is still no consensus view on how to model fiscal policy. With the pur­
pose of guiding the empirical specification and the interpretation of results, it is followed the
seminal work of Baxter and King (1993). In this neoclassical model, unexpected temporary
increases in government spending might have different effects depending on the persistence of
the shock, financing (lump­sum versus distortionary taxation) and the productivity of spending.
In the first stage, government spending increases, decreasing available resources for both
consumption and investment, entailing a negative wealth effect. As an optimal decision, agents
decrease consumption and leisure as well as investment. Accordingly, labour supply expands,
causing real wages to fall and the labour input to increase. Capital markets are affected through
the improvement in the productivity of capital, and the real rental rate responds subsequently,
leading to an increase in real interest rate. It follows that output rises due to the higher labour
input, which cushions part of the fall in consumption. Afterwards, when spending returns to the
initial levels, the economy converges back to the initial equilibrium. The key determinant in
boosting the economy during the period of higher spending is the expansion in the labour sup­
ply. It results that the longer the temporary higher spending lasts, the more negative the wealth
effect and the more significant the stimulus to output.
If government spending is productive and affects the marginal productivity of capital and
labour inputs, then instead of depressing investment, capital accumulation is stimulated in ad­
dition to the increase in the labour force. The economy converges to a higher equilibrium, even
with a temporary increase in government spending. This phenomenon is not accounted for in
the proposed econometric model as the study focuses on non­productive government spending.
Previous results are, however, dependent on the assumption of lump­sum taxation, which
is rare in the real world. Once distortionary taxation is introduced, agents may have incentives
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to postpone both work and investment. Given a strong intertemporal substitution effect output
may decrease. Ultimately, the decision of how to finance the policy plays a vital role in deter­
mining the size of spending multipliers since choosing deficit­financing over higher taxes may
delay the harmful effects of the distortionary policy.
The new Keynesian model also provides insights on the effects of fiscal policy since it al­
lows for the role of demand, prices and nominal rigidities in the determination of real variables.
For instance, Christiano et al. (2011) show that in this context, a binding zero lower bound
can increase significantly the impact of higher government spending. Departing from a signifi­
cant increase in the discount factor, representing a greater desire for savings, they argue that if
the zero lower bound becomes binding before the real interest rate fully adjusts, there must be
instead a considerable fall in output. An increase in government expenditure is able to stimu­
late demand, decreasing firms’ mark­up and fuelling expected inflation. Given the inflationary
pressures, the real interest rate falls further, promoting consumption today in detriment of con­
sumption in the future, increasing output even further.
Through the analysis of a new Keynesian model in the context of a small open economy,
the work of Corsetti et al. (2013) presents evidence against fiscal policy being relatively more
effective as a stabilization policy under a fixed exchange rate regime. They argue that accom­
modating monetary policy can mimic the effects of fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate
regime. On the other hand, fiscal expansions expected to lead to consolidation measures in the
medium run have higher multipliers in the context of floating exchange rate regimes.
Galí et al. (2007) have also showed that financial frictions can have significant impacts on
the estimated multipliers. By introducing rule­of­thumb consumers in the standard new Keyne­
sian model, consumption can increase as a response to higher government spending, leading to
greater effects on output.
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III Shocks with Temporary and Permanent Effects
Integrated variables are considered cointegrated when they share the same stochastic trend. This
idea has been used in economics to translate the existence of a long­run equilibrium between
variables. Therefore, there is the possibility of distinguishing between two types of shocks, those
that drive the common stochastic trend (the long­run relation), and hence have permanent effects
and those which have transitory effects, temporarily driving variables outside of equilibrium.
One of the features of a SVECM is the possibility to separate these shocks.
Identification à la Blanchard and Perotti: A Motivation
Departing from the identification presented in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), considered one of
the most careful approaches to fiscal shocks in the context of VARs (Ramey (2011)), and the
one that more easily allows to introduce cointegration, it was assumed one cointegration relation
between government spending and output. Government spending, tax revenues and output are
all characterized by unit roots4, consequently, they can be represented in an error correction
model. The reduced form VECM specification is:
∆Xt = α0 +ΠXt−1 +
3∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−i + ut (1)
whereXt = (Gt, Tt, Yt) is a three­dimensional vector of quarterly government expenditure, total
tax revenue5 and output, all in real6 per capita values and in logarithms. Π is such thatΠ = γβ′,
where γ is a matrix of loading coefficients and β is the cointegration matrix. Γi is a short­run







t ) is a vector of reduced form residuals. Themodel includes 3 lags in differences
decided according to the AIC criterion and to ensure no serial correlation. As stated before, it is
4The statistical tests can be found in the appendix.
5This specification differs from the one in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which uses net tax revenues (tax
revenues net of transfer payments), a definition not very common as stated inMountford and Uhlig (2009). Transfer
payments have their own effects on economic variables, which can be different from taxation. Also, in order to
keep the specification as simple as possible, this variable is not included.
6Real variables were obtained using the GDP deflator. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that the results are
similar when using the own deflator.
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assumed one cointegration relation between government expenditure and output with no relation
concerning tax revenues. Thus, the cointegration matrix takes the form β = (1, 0, β3)′.
Identification Scheme
The presence of automatic stabilizers and policy responses to economic cycles in fiscal variables
creates the aforementioned problem of endogeneity. In order to overcome this issue, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) argue that the use of quarterly data allows the disentangling of automatic
responses from discretionary ones. The presence of implementation lags in fiscal policy creates
a window where all responses are only automatic. Regarding public expenditure7, there is no
reason to believe that there are immediate responses to output. On the other hand, this is not the
case with tax revenues, as a large proportion of total tax revenues derives from income taxation.
With the purpose of removing the impact of output on tax revenues, obtaining a measure
of policy responses, it is estimated what is called “cyclical adjusted tax revenues” following the
early work of Giorno et al. (1995) and adapted by a series of OECD papers (Van den Noord
(2000), Girouard and André (2006) and Price et al. (2015)). Considering Tt = δYt + t′t , this
method consists on estimating the elasticity of total tax revenues to output (δ) and using t′t ≡
Tt− δ̂Yt as an IV to estimate tax policy shocks. Using information regarding the tax system and
estimated elasticities of the different tax components (personal income tax, corporate tax, social








where ηTiBi is the elasticity of tax i to its respective tax base, ηBiY is the elasticity of the tax
base of tax i to output, Ti is the total revenues of tax i and T is the total tax revenues 8.
There is no reason to account for this variable in the cointegration relation. Firstly, cointe­
7It is being only considered government purchases of goods and services. The same would not be true if transfer
payments here included.
8In the appendix can be found more details on how this elasticity was estimated and the assumptions behind it.
Moreover, results are robust to changes in estimated elasticities, as found by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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gration tests show no cointegration relation between either variable and cyclically adjusted tax
revenues. Moreover, the Wald Test indicates that the coefficient in the already considered coin­
tegration equation must be zero9. Secondly, public debt is characterized by a unit root, which
casts doubts on the possible cointegration between government spending and tax revenues10.
As in any structural identification, structural innovations are assumed to be linked to re­
duced form ones through a non­singular B matrix such that:
ut = Bεt (3)
where εt is a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated shocks with unit variance.
From the previous assumptions, B is such that:uGtut′t
uYt
 =






One more restriction is needed in order to ensure identification: it will be assumed that
b12 = 0, meaning that expenditure shocks are ordered first11. The identification scheme becomes
very similar to a Cholesky decomposition.
Data
Data on fiscal variables, GDP and GDP deflator was obtained from the NIPA tables from the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Government expenditure corresponds to the sum of purchases of
goods and services by the government for both federal and local and state governments. Total
taxation consists on the sum of total income taxation (personal and corporate), social contribu­
tions, taxes on production and imports and taxes from the Rest of the World, also at the federal
and state and local governments levels, which has then been adjusted as explained before. All
series were seasonally adjusted by the source.
9The results can be found in the appendix.
10Even thought, there are other sources of spending and revenue also characterized by unit roots (like transfer
payments) which could be the cause, the government budget is also not a stationary variable. This indicates that
sources of revenue are not cointegrated with sources of spending. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that cyclically
adjusted tax revenues are not part of any cointegration relation.
11Another alternative would be to assume that taxation shocks are ordered first, results do not change.
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Results
Figure 2 shows the estimated IRF12 for the period of Q1­1948 to Q3­2019. Without any long­run
restrictions, it is clear that spending shocks seem to have temporary effects on the variables of
interest, while output shocks have permanent effects on both variables.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions
The figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable. Shaded areas
correspond to 95% confidence intervals obtained using bootstrapping.
This illustrates the argument discussed before: shocks with permanent effects on output,
which can be interpreted as TFP (total factor productivity) shocks, promote economic growth
and hence increase spending in the long run. Nevertheless, this spending is targeted at improv­
ing the quality of life of citizens, not being considered fiscal policy in the sense of its usual
discretionary role. At the same time, the neoclassical theory predicts that permanent increases
in government spending have positive and permanent impacts on output due to permanent neg­
ative wealth effects. Presumably, the effects of the TFP shock on output may be enhanced by
the response of government spending.
Separating Shocks with Temporary and Permanent Effects
The next step is formally separating the two types of shocks, and in order to achieve it equation










where X∗0 contains initial values and deterministics, Θ
∑t





jut−j collects the shocks with transitory effects.
12Figure 7 in the appendix presents the remaining impulse response functions.
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The matrix ΘB (matrix that collects the long­run impact of shocks) has reduced rank due
to cointegration. The model in equation (1) with k endogenous variables and r cointegration
relations (rank(Π) = r) implies a rank(ΘB) = k − r: since some variables share a stochas­
tic trend, r columns of ΘB are linear combinations of each other. One possibility is to set r
columns of ΘB to zeros separating the shocks which only have transitory effects from the ones
that have permanent effects (similar to restrictions à la Blanchard and Quah (1988)) and reduce
the restrictions imposed on B itself needed to ensure identification. As a result, it is possible to
distinguish r shocks with temporary effects and k − r with permanent effects.
In the considered case, there is one cointegration relation, therefore only one shock with
temporary effects. Departing from the results found before, the column which corresponds to
government spending shocks is set to zeros, representing the shock with temporary effects on
all variables. Conversely, the output shock represents a shock with permanent effects. This is
just a matter of naming, as so far these transitory/permanent effects can be driven by shocks to
both variables, government spending or output. The tax shock is, therefore, the second shock
with permanent effects.
Another property of the ΘB matrix is r linearly dependent rows. Regardless of the iden­
tification scheme, cointegration implies a given long­run relation, i.e. after any type of shock
variables will return to the condition established by the cointegration equation:
β ·Xt = 0 (7)
In the current specification, the one cointegration equation simplifies to:





Consequently, the first row of ΘB is equal to the third row scaled by a constant, −β3.
As a result, the previously mentioned identification assumptions correspond to only two inde­
pendent restrictions. As the identification of structural shocks requires k(k − 1)/2 restrictions
(in this case three), it will rely on the properties of the IV: cyclically adjusted tax revenues are
not contemporaneously affected by output shocks. This strategy allows to remove some of the
restrictions imposed before. The B and ΘB matrices are such that:uGtut′t
uYt
 =











Figure 3 displays the results for new identifying assumptions. “Temp” stands for the shock
with temporary effects (henceforth temporary shock) and “Perm” for the previously mentioned
output shock associated with permanent effects (henceforth permanent shock).
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Perm shock→ Y response
Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions
The figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable. Shaded areas
correspond to 95% confidence intervals obtained using bootstrapping.
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The temporary shock displays similar effects to what would be desirable and expectable
for a stimulus package according to theory: both spending and output increase temporarily.
Tax policy is affected by a fall in taxes during the first period, compensated by smaller and
smaller increases afterwards. As already mentioned, the tax shock has permanent effects on all
variables, and potentially because of its distortionary features it decreases output in the long run
and consequently, government spending. Nonetheless, its impact is such that the cointegration
relation is preserved. Finally, the permanent shock increases output, taxation and government
spending both in the short and long run, being associated with a TFP shock.
These results show small differences when compared with the previous ones which raises
the question of whether this shock with temporary effects is only a result of temporary changes
to government spending. In order to understand if this might be true, the model is re­estimated
with the additional constraint of b13 = 013 (the coefficient is equal to 0.0017 in the original
model with a p­value of 0.502 for the null hypothesis of being equal to 0). As results do not
change substantially14, there is evidence in favour of the previous consideration. It also indicates
that the assumption of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) might not be very strong, at least regarding
shocks that affect the economy temporarily.
IV Identifying Government Spending Shocks
The identification scheme presented before allows to study the effect of shocks which mimic the
implementation of fiscal policy with stabilization purposes: temporary changes in government
spending with temporary consequences for output. This interpretation of the temporary shock
allows to build on the cointegration assumption, an alternative identification scheme to analyse
the impact of fiscal policy. The strategy also benefits from the separation of shocks which have
13This restriction also affects the impact of the shock with permanent effects as it no longer has a contempo­
raneous impact on output. This assumption is not very restrictive, as these shocks are associated with economic
growth, and it is plausible to assume that the effect takes time to be reflected in government spending.
14Results can be found in the appendix in figure 8.
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permanent effects on government spending as they are not associated with the stabilization role
of government spending, but rather to improving the services provided by the government.
Following on several concerns with the identification of exogenous spending shocks, the
model is augmented to include several variables of interest and deliver more reliable results.
Empirical Specification
Building on the previous model and still assuming only one cointegration relation between gov­
ernment spending and output, the empirical model has the following reduced form:
∆Xt = α0 +ΠXt−1 +
3∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−i + ζWt + ut (11)
where Xt = (Gt, t′t, Yt, D/Y,∆i) is a five­dimensional vector of quarterly government expen­
diture, cyclically adjusted tax revenues, output15, debt­to­GDP ratio and nominal interest rate in
first differences, Wt = (%∆GFt|t−1) is a vector of exogenous variables, in this case, the growth
rate of forecasts for government expenditure elaborated in t − 1 for period t. Π is such that
Π = γβ′, where γ is a matrix of loading coefficients and β is the cointegration matrix. Γi is a
short­run coefficient matrix for i = 1, 2, 3. α0 includes a constant term and seasonal dummies.








t ) is a vector of reduced form residuals. Once more, the
model includes three lags for endogenous variables and no lags of exogenous variables. The
cointegration matrix is of the form: β = ((1, 0, β3, 0, 0) : (0, 0, 0, 0, 1))′.
As argued before, financing is a key determinant in the effects of fiscal policy. A measure
of tax policy was already included in the first specification as a way to control for changes in
taxes at the moment of higher government spending or later on. However, as increases in public
spending must be matched with higher taxes at some point in time and not necessarily at the
point of higher expenditure, the restriction associated with the temporary shock not affecting
tax policy in the long run will no longer be considered.
An important factor that seems to be almost always forgotten is debt. Favero and Giavazzi
15All as defined before: real per capita values and in logarithms.
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(2007) found that failing to account for debt dynamics can lead to IRF that show spending ex­
pansions along unsustainable paths for the debt­to­GDP ratio. For this reason, it is important to
include this series in the model (as advised in Favero and Giavazzi (2007)) since very high val­
ues may affect back fiscal policy, limiting its availability or even requiring fiscal consolidation.
Data shows that debt levels have been increasing over the past years. Barro (1979) argues
that temporary increases in government spending are not reflected in taxation as an optimal pol­
icy choice in order to minimize the deadweight loss existent in tax collection. Moreover, tax
revenue is adjusted simply due to reflection of automatic stabilizers. In the end, there is no rea­
son to believe that an equilibrium for the debt­to­GDP ratio exists: it may vary freely depending
on changes to the normal paths of government spending and output. These ideas seem to be con­
sistent with the data, as units roots characterize both debt and the debt­to­GDP ratio. Following
these arguments, the empirical model will not limit the long­run path of the debt­to­GDP ratio
through either long­run restrictions or the imposition of cointegration.
On a different note, it would not make sense to consider any cointegration relation with
the debt­to­GDP ratio as there is no reason to believe that it moves together with any of the other
variables in the model. Debt is the result of more than just the difference between government
spending and tax revenues, and since other components like transfers and interest payments
have considerable weights on the government budget, important variables are missing so that a
cointegration relation would make sense. Standard cointegration tests also point that no other
cointegration relation should be considered.
The interest rate plays an important role in the transmissionmechanism as above­mentioned
through the work of Christiano et al. (2011) and Corsetti et al. (2013), hence its inclusion is fun­
damental to the model. From an empirical point a view, Rossi and Zubairy (2011) also highlight
the relevance of considering monetary policy in the study of fiscal policy. The authors demon­
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strate that both policies have been responsible for a large part of economic fluctuations and that
neglecting one of them might lead to confounding effects.
Given that the interest lies on understanding the effects of spending expansions on output,
the interest rate is made stationary using first­differences16. Introducing stationary variables in
the VECM requires an individual cointegration relation for each variable alone, as it is possible
to see in the second row of matrix β.
As mentioned before, one of the major concerns with this approach is anticipated changes
in government spending17. The neoclassical theory states that what matters for the aforemen­
tioned negative wealth effect is the expected present value of government spending and not the
timing of spending. If agents expect higher government spending in the future or spending is
announced beforehand, then agents will react before the actual spending takes place. With this
in mind, professional forecasts of government spending made in the previous quarter are used to
control for spending changes which were anticipated18. Although this variable could have been
included as endogenous19, it is not endogenous to any of the other variables, as expectations in
the previous period are by definition not affected by current information. This procedure al­
lows to minimize the required identification restrictions and increase degrees of freedom in the
estimation. They are also included in a stationary form to avoid spurious results20.
16It also eliminates problems with possible cointegration relations found in the data but not predicted by theory.
Yet, results do not change if the variable is included in levels but not accounted for in any cointegration relation.
17Expectations are indeed one of the major problems with econometric models. Agents have access to several
sources of information, and if they perceive future changes their behaviour can change before any change actually
takes place. One of the possible ways to deal with this problem is to include Factors in the estimation, as suggested
in Bernanke et al. (2005). This methodology would allow controlling for a greater set of information related to
expectations and other variables that are important for fiscal research and that cannot be included as the degrees
of freedom would decrease substantially. However, including Factors in the SVECM would not be done easily
for different reasons. Firstly, it would be required the understanding of the relationship between the temporary
shock and the Factors. Secondly, identification restrictions would require strong assumptions regarding output,
government spending and the Factors. For these reasons, the most conservative approach was chosen.
18TheRamey news variable could also have been included, but given the sample reduction it would only represent
two dates and the expected higher military spending seems to be captured by the professional forecasts.
19Results are robust to including this variable as endogenous and ordering it first so that it is not influenced by
any of the other variables contemporaneously.
20Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) also suggests this stationary form due to data revisions over time.
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Identification Strategy
Intending to separate the shock with transitory effects21 from the ones with permanent effects,
the long­run impact of government spending on itself and output is set to zero (θ11 = θ31 = 0
in matrix ΘB). As discussed before, the debt­to­GDP ratio and tax policy are free of long­run
restrictions. Therefore, the temporary shock has only temporary effects on government spending
and output, which is enough to disentangle the shocks implicit in the cointegration relation.
Identification of the other shocks requires further restrictions22 which are set as follows23












b11 b12 b13 0 0
0 b22 0 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0 b35
b41 b42 b43 b44 b45















0 θ12 θ13 θ14 0
θ21 θ22 θ23 θ24 0
0 θ32 θ33 θ34 0
θ41 θ42 θ43 θ44 θ45
θ51 θ52 θ53 θ54 θ55
 (13)
Government spending shocks are assumed not to affect tax policy in the same period,
equivalent to setting b21 = 024. The properties of cyclically adjusted tax revenues, once more
allow to impose that output shocks do not influence tax policy contemporaneously (b23 = 0).
The debt­to­GDP ratio is a function of current government spending, tax policy, output and
interest rate, therefore any shock to these variables influences debt contemporaneously. Thus,
21There is only one cointegration relation, therefore only one shock with temporary effects. It follows that the
remaining four have permanent effects. Remember, however, that regardless of the shock, cointegration is always
preserved.
22As explained before the previous constraints only amount to one independent restriction.
23Themain results are robust to a Cholesky decomposition. Additionally, as in the previousmodel, the coefficient
b13 is not statistically different from zero (p­value of 0.882) and setting b13 = 0 does not change the results. Once
again, this can be interpreted as output shocks not having a contemporaneous impact on government spending.
24As argued before, the ordering of spending versus taxes is irrelevant, results do not change considering the
opposite relation. In fact, the estimated coefficients are never statistically significant. If on the contrary, it was
assumed that temporary government shocks did not have a long­run impact on tax policy (setting θ21 = 0) as
argued by Barro (1979), results would not change extensively. IRF can be found in figure 10 in the appendix.
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it is assumed that shocks to the debt­to­GDP ratio do not affect government expenditure, tax
policy and output in the same period by setting b14 = b24 = b34 = 0. This option can be a
reasonable assumption as the feedback from debt to fiscal variables takes time to build up.
It is assumed further that interest rate shocks do not to affect government spending and tax
policy contemporaneously (b15 = b25 = 0)25. As long as there is no coordination between fiscal
and monetary policy, it can be suitable to take government choices as exogenous to monetary
policy. Nevertheless, the opposite would not be accurate as the interest rate reacts to changes
in government spending or taxation through either changes in the real interest rate, expected
inflation or Central Bank policy.
Aiming not to constrain the B matrix heavily and allowing the interest rate and the debt­
to­GDP ratio to be affected by all other variables in the same period, the results rely on the
assumption of long­run money neutrality. Under this hypothesis, changes in the nominal interest
rate do not affect real variables in the long run, therefore shocks to the interest rate have no long­
run impact on government spending, tax policy or output, which refers to imposing θ15 = θ25 =
θ35 = 0. This restriction follows the idea in Blanchard and Quah (1988), and it is widely used
in monetary policy research, as noted by Ritto et al. (2019).
Data
Aside from the data sources already mentioned, the forecasts for government expenditure come
from the Professional Forecasters Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. As sug­
gested in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), given the small period where these estimates
are available they were put together with the same estimates from the Greenbook projections
from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors26. The short­run interest rate corresponds to the
effective federal funds rate and was extracted from the FRED data. Finally, public debt was
25Note also that interest payments are not included in spending.
26More information about how the two series were put together can be found in the section Data of the appendix.
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obtained from the OECD statistics, and it corresponds to the total debt of the general govern­
ment (i.e. federal and local and state government). All series were seasonally adjusted by the
source27.
Results
Figure 4 depicts part of the results28 for the IRF of the estimated model for the period of Q2­1970
to Q3­201929.






























































Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions
The figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable, with exception
of∆i, whose response and shock is given in differences of percentages. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence
intervals obtained using bootstrapping.
In accordance with the previous discussion, the temporary shock (refered to as “Temp” in
the results) is associated with spending shocks in the context of a stabilization fiscal policy. The
“Perm” shock (named permanent shock), on the other hand, is associated with TFP and consti­
tutes the fourth shock with permanent effects in the model. Note, once more, that all permanent
shocks preserve the cointegration relation.
The temporary spending shock by construction increases government spending and out­
put temporarily. Taxation reacts by increasing in the first periods, followed by a permanent
27Except for public debt and the interest rate, which were adjusted using the X13 routine provided by the US
Census Bureau and implemented in Gretl.
28All results were obtained using the software JMuilti (see http://www.jmulti.de/). The cointegration relation was
estimated using the Johansen approach, the reduced formVEC using Ordinary Least Squares and the structural form
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Bootstrapping was done with 100 replications and using Hall Bootstrap
Percentile Confidence Intervals.
29The remaining IRF can be found in the appendix in figure 9.
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non­significant decrease. The debt­to­GDP ratio is not significantly affected during the first
quarters, as a positive response from both tax policy and output means higher tax revenues.
However, a year later, debt starts increasing, converging to a higher level, which is coherent
with Barro (1979) arguments. The interest rate responds with a negative variation, which could
be explained by an increase in expected inflation as theory predicts a positive response of the
real interest rate to spending shocks30.
These results seem to be consistent with existent literature in what concerns the direction
of responses, however differences arise in their persistency. For instance, comparing the effects
of the considered temporary shock with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) spending shocks allows
to conclude that this results do not show as much persistence as their model in first difference.
The discrepancies could be partially related to the identification assumptions and cointegration
relation. Considering now the results from the augmented VAR in Ramey (2011), the behaviour
of output, taxation and nominal interest rate is quite similar, yet differences in persistency are
even more relevant. Ramey (2011) results show that it takes more periods for the impact to
become zero and none of the variables is affected permanently.
The permanent shock is associated with TFP as it displays similar effects to that of eco­
nomic growth. Also by construction, it increases output and spending permanently. However,
in the short run, government spending is not very responsive reflecting a lag between economic
growth and higher spending. Tax policy reacts with higher taxes, yet its presumed distortionary
feature is counteracted by the positive effects of TPF on output and the increase in government
spending. The debt­to­GDP ratio decreases substantially reflecting a permanently higher tax
revenue and output. Finally, the nominal interest rate is affected positively by the permanent
shock, which can be interpreted as the response of the Central Bank through a Taylor Rule.




Computing reliablemultipliers in this set up is a complicated task. As variables are in logarithms,
IRF correspond to elasticities. As a consequence, in order to compute multipliers, these need to
be converted back to monetary units. The traditional procedure requires IRF to be multiplied by
the average value of the output­to­government­spending ratio. Ramey (2019) warns that this ad
hoc “conversion factor” biases upwards multipliers’ estimates given that the ratio is not constant
over time. Other methodologies have been developed to provide more trustworthy estimates,
but none of them can be applied to the specified empirical model, as they would compromise









where %∆Yi corresponds to the percent variation in output given the temporary shock, %∆Gi
is the percent change in government spending given the same shock, ¯Y /G is the average ratio
of output­to­government­spending. Notice that for t = 0 it corresponds to the impact multiplier
and that for t > 0 the result is an accumulated multiplier.
Estimated multipliers can be found in figure 5. The impact multiplier is equal to 1.35,
significantly above the usual estimates, which typically range from 0.6 to 1. However, it rapidly
goes below 1 after one year and a half, converging to a value around 0.4. In spite of the impact
converging to zero, accumulating the consecutive effects yields permanently positive cumulative
multipliers. Nevertheless, given the size of the confidence bands of the IRF, these multipliers
are most likely not significantly different from zero at any horizon.
31The focus of this study is on the cointegration relation between output and government spending, therefore it
has forgone the possibility of computing tax multipliers. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that in order to do so,
the effects on cyclically adjusted tax revenues would need to be converted back to the tax revenues. Nonetheless,
Riera­Crichton et al. (2016) argue that the use of cyclically adjusted tax revenues to estimate tax multipliers has
several pitfalls, namely the estimated elasticities, also pointed out by Caldara and Kamps (2012). This adds up to
the reasons why these multipliers were not estimated.
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Robustness Checks
In this section, the robustness of the previous results is tested through changes in the sample
considered. Gordon and Krenn (2010) argue that when computing multipliers the sample period
plays an essential role for the relevance of the results, as they only make sense given the sample
characteristics, namely different utilization of resources and present constraints.
Given data availability, the sample period does not cover major war events, which have
peculiar features and must be considered carefully. Departing from previous contributions to
literature, ideally the sample would be divided into three periods with the first break happening
in 1980. Perotti (2005) argues that transmission mechanisms have changed considerably due
to a possible structural break somewhere in the 80s. Lastly, the second break should be set in
2008 with the beginning of the Financial Crisis and of a binding zero lower bound. Nonetheless,
the first and third period have very few observations, resulting in an unstable model unable to
provide accurate estimates. Following on this pitfall the sample is divided in two to guarantee
enough observations in each period. The sample split happens in Q3­1994.





Figure 5: Cumulative Spending Multipliers
The IRF change considerably in the first part (Q2­1970 to Q2­1994) yielding imprecise
and non­statistical significant estimates, and null or negative spending multipliers. These results
seem to be a consequence of the cointegration relation, which was not clear at the beginning
of the sample. As it would be expected, results are highly dependent on the validity of the
cointegration relation. The second part of the sample (Q3­1994 to Q3­2019) provides results
very close to the ones found before and an impact multiplier even greater, 3.68, as shown in
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figure 5. The effects of fiscal policy are also more persistent, following from a cumulative
multiple greater than 1 for almost four years. This could be a result of the zero lower bound
being binding for about half of this sample split.
V Conclusion
This paper explores an extension of the SVARmodels used in fiscal research, providing insights
on the effects of considering cointegration between government spending and output. In spite
of being rarely considered, the data seems to suggest such an assumption.
Departing from the cointegration relation, one possibility is to disentangle shocks which
affect temporarily government spending from those that have permanent effects. Providing an
interpretation for these shocks brings forward an important feature of the data available for eco­
nomic research. Government spending data is contaminated with changes resulting from the
actual role of stabilisation policy and others driven by economic growth.
The shock decomposition allows the analysis to focus on “throw­in­the­ocean” govern­
ment spending, as mentioned by Perotti (2011), and its stabilisation role. Findings reveal a
positive, yet not significant, impact of a fiscal expansion on output, with an impact spending
multiplier of 1.35 and a persistent positive cumulative multiplier.
Aside from bringing some light into a possible identification scheme not available in the
standard models, it reinforces the importance of modelling choices and assumptions in the shock
identification process. The conclusions taken seem to be aligned with existent literature, how­
ever they reveal differences in the persistency of responses. This finding suggest that cointegra­
tion should be accounted for when found, as it allows to better understand the persistency of the
effects on economic variables. As already argued in previous studies, fiscal policy results are
very often “hostages” of the identifying assumptions.
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In order to test if variables are stationary32, Augmented Dickey­Fuller Tests were used. Under
the null hypothesis (H0) the time series is not stationary. The null hypothesis can be tested
against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity (with constant in the model ­ second column in









GDP 0.9932 0.2858 Non­stationary I(1)
Government Expenditure 0.6909 0.1045 Non­stationary I(1)
Total Tax Revenues 0.9089 0.0076
Non­stationary I(1)
/ Trend Stationary
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue 0.67 0.3552 Non­stationary I(1)
Public Debt 0.9989 0.954 Non­stationary I(1)
Public Debt­to­GDP ratio 0.9371 0.9108 Non­stationary I(1)
Growth Rate Forecasted Government
Expenditure
0 0 Stationary
Effective Federal Funds Rate 0.0928 0.155 Non­stationary I(1)
First Differences Effective Federal
Funds Rate
0 0 Stationary
3­Month Treasury Bill 0.1878 0.4091 Non­stationary I(1)
First Differences 3­Month Treasury
Bill
0 0 Stationary
Table 1: Results from Augmented Dickey­Fuller Tests
32GDP, Government Spending, Total Tax Revenues and Public Debt are defined in real per capital terms.
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I.2. Cointegration Tests
With the purpose of better understanding the long­run relationships between the variables, sev­
eral cointegration tests were conducted, namely the Trace Test and the Maximum Eigenvalue
Test. Both test a sequence of null hypothesis such thatH0 : rank(Π) = p and H1 : rank(Π) =











GDP p = 0 0.0002 0.0002 rank(Π) = 1
Government Expenditure p = 1 0.1826 0.1826 1 equation
GDP p = 0 0.1588 0.2353 rank(Π) = 0
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue p = 1 0.1292 0.1292
GDP p = 0 0.9093 0.8773 rank(Π) = 0
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 1 0.7492 0.7492
Government Expenditure p = 0 0.0099 0.0871 rank(Π) = 2
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue p = 1 0.0071 0.0071 rank(Π) = 0
Government Expenditure p = 0 0.3299 0.7001 rank(Π) = 0
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 1 0.0437 0.437
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue p = 0 0.7611 0.7197 rank(Π) = 0
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 1 0.61 0.61
GDP p = 0 0.0039 0.0036 rank(Π) = 1
Government Expenditure p = 1 0.2931 0.3194 1 equation
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue p = 2 0.2686 0.2686
GDP p = 0 0.0398 0.0131 rank(Π) = 1
Government Expenditure p = 1 0.7475 0.6934 1 equation
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 2 0.6759 0.6759
GDP p = 0 0.7175 0.5793 rank(Π) = 0
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue p = 1 0.8829 0.8329
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 2 0.9735 0.9735
Government Expenditure p = 0 0.392 0.4918 rank(Π) = 0
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 1 0.4777 0.5627











GDP p = 0 0.1394 0.1103 rank(Π) = 0
Government Expenditure p = 1 0.6588 0.6797
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue p = 2 0.5444 0.4799
Debt­to­GDP ratio p = 3 0.6475 0.6475
Table 2: Results from Cointegration Tests
I.3. Wald Tests
With the goal of understanding which variables should be included in the cointegration relation
the followingWald Test were performed. The null hypothesis (H0) of the Wald Test is βk = 0 in
the cointegration relation against the alternative hypothesis (H1) of βk ̸= 0 in the cointegration
relation.
Wald Test for the exclusion of variables from cointegration relation
Variables in the Cointegration Relation Excluding P­value Conclusion
GDP
Government Expenditure Cyclically Adjusted
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue Tax Revenue 0.3974 Exclude
GDP
Government Expenditure
Debt­to­GDP ratio Debt­to­GDP ratio 0.0514 Exclude
GDP
Government Expenditure
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue Cyclically Adjusted
Debt­to­GDP Tax Revenue 0.1409 Exclude
GDP
Government Expenditure
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue
Debt­to­GDP Debt­to­GDP 0.0521 Exclude
GDP
Government Expenditure Cyclically Adjusted
Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenue Tax Revenue,
Debt­to­GDP Debt­to­GDP 0.0704 Exclude
Table 3: Results from Wald Test
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I.4. Estimating the Elasticity of Total Tax Revenue to Output
In order to estimate the required elasticities to compute δ (the elasticity of taxes with respect to
output) from equation (2), it was followed the work of Giorno et al. (1995), updated by Van den
Noord (2000), Girouard and André (2006) and Price et al. (2015), mimicking Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005). These papers are part of series of OECD papers estimating
output­gaps and cyclical adjusted fiscal budgets, for which tax elasticities are required. Themost
recent paper corrects somemistakesmade in the previous ones and accounts from recent changes
in the tax system and representative consumer and for self­employed individuals (among other
assumptions), as a result it constitutes the paper with the most reliable estimates.
The total amount of taxes is divided into four major categories: Indirect Taxes, Personal
Income Tax, Social Contributions and Corporate Tax. For each of the taxes it is needed its
elasticity to the tax base (ηTiBi), which depends highly on the tax codes and therefore extracted
from the aforementioned papers and the elasticity of the tax base to output (ηBiY ) which is
estimated empirically.
Below can be found the assumptions made and the table with the estimates for elasticities,
as well as the graph with the computed cyclically­adjusted tax revenues.
1. Indirect Taxes
• Tax Base: GDP
• Collection Lag: 0
• Quarter Dependence: 0
• Elasticity of Tax to Tax Base: OECD paper
– Period 1947­1992: ηTiBi = 1 Giorno et al. (1995)
– Period 1992­1999: ηTiBi = 0.9 Van den Noord (2000)
34
– Period 1999­2005: ηTiBi = 1 Girouard and André (2006)
– Period 2005­2019: ηTiBi = 1 Price et al. (2015)
• Elasticity of Tax Base to Output: 1 (tax base is equal to GDP)
2. Personal Income Tax
• Tax Base: Earnings
• Collection Lag: 0
• Quarter Dependence: 0
Total personal income tax revenue is derived according to the following equation (from
Van den Noord (2000)):
TPIT = t(W )W (E)E(Y ) (15)
where t is the tax rate,W is wage, E is employment and Y is GDP.










































• Elasticity of Tax to Earnings: OECD paper
– Period 1947­1992: ηTiBi = 2.5 Giorno et al. (1995)
– Period 1992­1999: ηTiBi = 1.3 Van den Noord (2000)
– Period 1999­2005: ηTiBi = 1.65 Price et al. (2015) (given updates)
– Period 2005­2019: ηTiBi = 1.64 Price et al. (2015)
• Elasticity of Earnings to Employment: lag 0 of a regression of log change of wages on first
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lead and lags 0­4 of log change of employment
• Elasticity of Employment to Output: lag 0 of regression of log of employment on first lead
and 0­4 lags of log of output 33
• Note: It is assumed the same elasticity for employees and for self­employed in all papers
with the exception of Price et al. (2015)
3. Social Contributions
• Tax Base: Earnings
• Collection Lags: 0
• Quarter Dependence: 0
The approach is exactly the same as the one used for personal income tax.
• Elasticity of Tax to Earnings: OECD paper
– Period 1947­1992: ηTiBi = 0.8 Giorno et al. (1995)
– Period 1992­1999: ηTiBi = 0.9 Van den Noord (2000)
– Period 1999­2005: ηTiBi = 0.85 Price et al. (2015) (given updates)
– Period 2005­2019: ηTiBi = 0.85 Price et al. (2015)
• Note: It is assumed the same elasticity for employees and for self­employed in all papers
with the exception of Price et al. (2015)
4. Corporate Tax
• Tax Base: Profits
• Collection Lags: Yes
• Quarter Dependence: Yes
• Elasticity of Tax to Tax Base:
33The data was obtained from the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
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– Period 1947­1992: ηTiBi = 0.85 Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the authors argue that
due to collection lags, the elasticity is lower that 1 (from Giorno et al. (1995)).
– Period 1992­1999: ηTiBi = 1 Van den Noord (2000), where it was assumed that taxes
were proportional to the tax base
– Period 1999­2005: ηTiBi = 1 Girouard and André (2006), keeping previous assump­
tions
– Period 2005­2015: ηTiBi = 3.45 Price et al. (2015), the authors argue that the propor­
tionality assumption is not valid due to collection lags and deduction of past losses
• Elasticity of Tax Base to Output: lag 0 of a regression of log change of profits on first lead
and 0­4 lags of log changes of output
In Table 4 can be found the estimated elasticities, which were obtained as explained above.
Putting all together, δ is estimated using weighted averages of the previous values. The reason
for this choice lies on ensuring a smooth series for the IV, as applying the previous elasticities
results on a variable with significant ups and downs every time another estimate is used. How­
ever, when comparing the results from both variables, they share the same patters overtime.
Afterwards, the IV is obtained using t′t = Tt − δtYt, letting δ vary across time 34. The idea is
to guarantee that each elasticity is weighted by the correct proportion that the tax takes in each
quarter and is correctly reflected in each period output. The resulting IV is represented in below
in Figure 6.
34This differs from Blanchard and Perotti (2002) which consider an average value of δ.
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Estimated Elasticities




ηTiBi 1 0.9 1 1 0.99
ηBiY 1 1 1 1 1
ηTiY 1 0.9 1 1 0.99
Personal Income Tax
ηTiBi 2.19 0.50 3.38 4.12 2.35
ηBiY 0.13 0.32 ­0.02 0.05 0.11
ηTiY 0.29 0.16 ­0.08 0.19 0.26
Social Contributions
ηTiBi 1.26 0.59 2.25 2.55 1.41
ηBiY 0.13 0.32 ­0.02 0.05 0.11
ηTiY 0.16 0.19 ­0.05 0.12 0.16
Corporate Tax
ηTiBi 0.85 1 1 3.45 1.40
ηBiY 4.32 0.80 3.21 6.34 4.35
ηTiY 3.67 0.80 3.21 21.89 6.11
















































Figure 6: US Cyclically Adjusted Tax Revenues
Ideally, there would be more estimates available for different periods, which would allow
to better model the way elasticities change over time and better infer on the consequences of tax
changes on GDP. Note, however, that changes to the estimates have little impact on the results
found, just as found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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II Further Results
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions
he figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable, with exception of∆i, whose response
and shock is given in differences of percentages. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals obtained using bootstrapping.
The results correspond to the adapted Blanchard and Perotti (2002) model, only with short­run restrictions.





Temp shock→ G response
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions
The figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable. Shaded areas correspond to 95%
confidence intervals obtained using bootstrapping. The results correspond to the adapted Blanchard and Perotti (2002), model with
long­run restrictions and overidentified to understand the role of output shocks on the temporary shock.
“Temp” stands for the shock which has temporary effects on all variables. “Perm” stands the shock which is associated to TFP shocks.
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions
The figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable, with exception of ∆i, whose
response and shock is given in differences of percentages. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals obtained using boot­
strapping.
The results correspond to the empirical model.
“Temp” stands for the shock which has temporary effects on both output and government spending. “Perm” stands for the shock asso­
ciated with TFP shocks.
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Functions
The figures show impulse response functions in percentage to 1% increase in the respective variable, with exception of ∆i, whose
response and shock is given in differences of percentages. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals obtained using boot­
strapping.
The results correspond to the empirical model where it is imposed that temporary shock do not have permanent effects on taxation.
“Temp” stands for the shock which has temporary effects on both output and government spending. “Perm” stands for the shock asso­

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• 3­Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Mar­
ket Rate
• Forecasted Real Government Consump­




• Government Expenditure and Gross In­
vestment
• Government Expenditure and Gross In­
vestment deflator
• Personal Current Taxes, Profits before
Taxes
• Taxes from the Rest of the World
• Taxes on Corporate Income
• Taxes on Production and Imports
• Wages and Salaries
Seasonally Adjusted by the Source
• Contributions for Government Social In­
surance




Seasonally Adjusted using X­13­ARIMA­SEATS implemented
in Gretl (provided by the US Census Bureau)
• Forecasted Real Government Consump­
tion Expenditure and Gross Investment
Growth
Survey of Professional Forecasters and Greenbook projections
series were put together, given that they are produced in the same
way. Greenbook projections were taken from the middle of the
quarter to be in the same time period of the ones from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters; Due to different base years, the im­
plicit deflator (also forecasted) was used obtain the real growth.
When there was lack of data forecast data available the real im­
plicit deflator was used.
Table 6: Notes on Data
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